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JOTTINGS

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

ROBERT HEINLEIN, FREEDOM FIGHTER: Perhaps because it cultivates a highly individualistic readership, discussions in this periodical often ignore what would elsewhere be considered central issues and instead fasten leech-like on to a barely significant digression. The original issues introduced by the publication in Kipple #44 of Walt Willis' attack on the militarist philosophy of Robert Heinlein were of imposing significance: viz., social Darwinism and its validity, the value of cooperation among human societies, the question of whether it is better to be "dead" than "Red" (or vice versa), and the undesirability of nuclear warfare. Somehow, this impressive array of important issues did not inspire the readers of this publication to put forth their reasoned opinions en masse--possibly because no reader could be found to play the Devil's advocate and argue in favor of nuclear catastrophe. As a result, these important issues were largely ignored in favor of the singularly trivial point of whether or not Heinlein's fictional military utopia actually mirrored his personal preferences. Specifically, Walt Willis' offhand dismissal of a newspaper advertisement sponsored by Heinlein and outlining his opposition to disarmament seems to have stirred up a hornet's nest of confused opinion. Willis termed the advertisement a "crackpot manifesto", much to the consternation of Tom Perry and Walt Breen, whose liberal minds rebel at offhand denunciations of honest opposition to disarmament. The discussion to date has been further confused by the fact that nearly all of the participants either have never seen or have forgotten the exact content of the original petition.

Your obedient servant falls into the first category of debators, having glibly discussed the document for several months without ever having seen it. When Breen pointed out that my criticism of the manifesto was based on nothing more than the opinion of Walt Willis that it was a "crackpot" petition, I was understandably chagrined. Fortunately, my acute embarrassment resulted in Walt Willis very kindly forwarding a copy of the original newspaper advertisement, which I scrutinized with some care. Having finally examined the manifesto, I am prepared to reaffirm my original opinion--which was highly accurate, albeit based on the unreliable foundation of hearsay evidence. The petition circulated by Robert Heinlein and admitted to contain his political ideas and attitudes is, as Willis so aptly put it, a crackpot manifesto.

Tom Perry, whose defense of Heinlein was based upon his personal admiration for the man, may be anxious to re-examine his opinion after he has had an opportunity to scrutinize the petition. As for Walt Breen, who defended the manifesto with full knowledge of its content, I fear that the political discrimination of my old friend is deteriorating; or else his refusal to consider the document a "crackpot manifesto" is due to a quirk of memory which caused him to forget the contemptible sections of the petition and remember only the emotionally patriotic paragraphs.

Headlined "Who Are The Heirs Of Patrick Henry? Stand Up And Be Counted!", the inflammatory spiel is in rebuttal to an earlier full-page advertisement produced under the auspices of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. As far as I can determine from admittedly incomplete evidence, the SANE advertisement reminded the public of the horrors of nuclear war and advised that this unproductive alternative to disarmament not be embraced. In beginning his indictment, Robert Heinlein makes the pretense of exonerating his opponents from charges of conscious disloyalty--a hollow pretense which is utilized, in one form or another, in every so-called "respectable" right-wing jeremiad.

"It may well be that none of the persons whose names are used as the 'National' committee of SANE are Communists and we have no reason to suppose that any of the local people are Communists--possibly all of them are loyal and merely misguided."

Having made this grudging admission that the SANE committee-members, though ignorant, are "possibly" loyal (necessary corollary: they are quite possibly disloyal), Robert Heinlein apparently considers this concession to the traditions of courteous debate quite sufficient. Throughout the remainder of the manifesto, Heinlein devotes his energies to enthusiastically questioning, by innuendo, the patriotism, honesty, intelligence and sanity of anyone who supports disarmament. After establishing the "possible" patriotism of the sponsors of the SANE declaration, Heinlein nevertheless does not hesitate to state,

"...this manifesto is the rankest sort of Communist propaganda."

He continues in this vein throughout the body of his vehement protest:

"Khrushchev would like very much to have nuclear weapons 'considered apart' from infantry divisions in disarmament negotiations. And he is delighted when soft-headed Americans agree with him."

"It is no accident that this manifesto follows the Communist line, no coincidence that it 'happens' to appear all over the United States the very week that Khrushchev has announced smugly that the U.S.S.R. has ended their tests--and demands that we give up our coming, long-scheduled, and publicly-announced tests of a weapon with minimum fall-out."

"These proposals are not a road to world peace, they are abject surrender to tyranny. If we fall for them, then in weeks or months or a few years at most, Old Glory will be hauled down for the last time and the whole planet will be ruled by the Butchers of Budapest."

Having suitably vilified the members of SANE, Heinlein then proceeds to characterize his own beliefs--which are just about what could have been predicted from a familiarity with the underlying philosophy of many of his science fiction stories. He fervently proclaims his loyalty to the doctrine of Patrick Henry, however inapplicable it may be to the current world situation. Robert Heinlein, we are told, would rather die than risk enslavement to Communism. This is, I suppose, his affair; I happen to believe that a man's life is his own, to dispose of as and when he pleases. Unfortunately, Mr. Heinlein makes it abundantly clear that his acceptance of suicide as a rational alternative to Communism applies also to racial suicide; rather than risk enslavement to Communism, he is cheerfully willing to kill not only himself, but also the entire human race.

"No scare talk of leukemia, mutation, or atomic holocaust will sway us. Is 'fall-out' dangerous? Of course it is! The risk to life and posterity has been willfully distorted by these Communist-line propagandists /he refers to these "possibly" patriotic members of SANE, of course/--but if it were a hundred times as great we would still choose it to the dead certainty of Communist enslavement. If atomic war comes, will it kill off the entire human race? Possibly--almost certainly so if the Masters of the Kremlin choose to use cobalt bombs on us."

Let me repeat that final statement, in the unlikely event that anyone failed to grasp its significance: Robert Heinlein freely admits that an atomic war may destroy the human race, but nevertheless prefers such an eventuality as an acceptable alternative to conciliation with the Communists. You will forgive my redundancy if I assert once again that the term "crackpot" is resoundingly appropriate when applied to this declaration of fanaticism. I am, admittedly, biased. If a situation were to arise where only two alternatives were offered, I would without hesitation choose to be "Red" rather than "dead". I am unalterably opposed to the Communist system of government for a number of reasons (better reasons, possibly, than the average American conservative possesses, for his vehement anti-Communism prevents him from learning very much about the system); I have no doubt that life under Communist domination would be exceedingly unpleasant, not only for me, but for the majority of Americans. But I have encountered no rational basis for the assumption that life under Communism is that legendary fate worse than death from which movie heroines are forever escaping. The people behind the Iron Curtain eat, drink, make love, work, laugh, cry and die in much the same way as those of the "free" world. They are subjected to limitations on their freedom and material possessions; but men have endured worse in every epoch of history without mass suicides occurring. And what Heinlein calmly contemplates is far worse than simple mass suicide: it is the end of a proud line which began when the first ape-like man climbed down out of the trees and stood erect. In short, I consider the doctrine that suicide is an acceptable alternative to Communism for an entire race to be the irrational mouthings of an arch-fanatic, a hideous proposal born of an illicit marriage between ignoble chauvinism and deep-seated hatefulness.

There is likely to be considerable difference of opinion with respect to this attitude, but at least one thing ought to be settled by this treatise: apologists for Heinlein may no longer complain of the injustice of imputing to Robert Heinlein the philosophies espoused by his fictional heroes. It is painfully clear that when Heinlein has a

xenophiac character in one of his stories advocate wiping out those sneaky Alpha Centaurians, the philosophy thereby illustrated is not merely an invention on the part of the writer, but an adaptation of his personal beliefs to a wider theatre.

There is, to be sure, honest opposition to disarmament proposals in this nation--but Heinlein's barbaric declaration of his willingness to engage in genocide is no proper part of this honest opposition. It ought to be classified--and was so classified by Walt Willis--in the proper category: as a fanatical litany of irrational hatred, deserving nothing more than contempt.

THE RELUCTANT CANDIDATE (INSTALLMENT THREE): Whatever else Barry Goldwater may be, he is a valuable asset to liberal rhetoricians. Whenever a prominent liberal spokesman wishes to engage in a display of verbal pyrotechnics in defense of his political beliefs and cannot locate a subject worthy of his time and talent, he has only to read a brace of Senator Goldwater's recent speeches and react accordingly. Barry's conservative harangues act as the catalyst and at the same time furnish a susceptible target for liberal arguments. My own dossier on Goldwater grows so swiftly that this "Reluctant Candidate" section of "Jottings" may well become a regular feature.

The proposed sale of immense quantities of American wheat to the Soviet Union appears to have particularly irritated the zealous solon from Arizona. In Coronado, California, on October 3rd, Goldwater vehemently attacked the tentative agreement as part of a "Soviet-American mutual aid society". He accused President Kennedy of "bailing out the highly vaunted Soviet farm collective with what I'm willing to bet will be tons of free American wheat." Of course, I'm certain that Barry Goldwater, as a legislator privy to reasonably complete information about government transactions, realized as well as we ignorant citizens that the issue at hand was the sale (not gift) of wheat to the Russians. The Administration has not suggested providing millions of tons of wheat to the Soviet Union out of charity, but rather in return for hard cash. Goldwater's pursuit of this red herring is probably best explained by the fact that those persons to whom his speeches are primarily directed are a good deal more likely to become infuriated with the Democratic Administration if they believe that we are feeding our "enemies" without payment.

Pressing his advantage with a no doubt receptive audience, Barry then pointed out that when he considered the proposed wheat sale along with the recently concluded nuclear test-ban agreement and President Kennedy's overtures toward joint space exploration with the Russians, he was reminded of the maxim, "If you can't lick them, join them." Extrapolating this into the assumption that the Kennedy Administration was promoting a program of spineless obeisance to the international Communist conspiracy, Barry defiantly vowed, "But I for one am not quite ready to lay down and play rover to Kremlin tunes." The implication that one's political opponents are unenthusiastic in their opposition to Communism is practically indispensable to any campaign in this day and age, but Senator Goldwater has recently introduced a new dimension of sophistry into such exercises.

Finally, having thoroughly excoriated the Kennedy Administration as a result of its willingness to convert useless surpluses of grain into badly needed currency, Goldwater puts forth what he fondly believes to be a superior alternative. Basically, he proposes to gain a political advantage as a result of the Soviet Union's agricultural misfortune. He is willing to sell quantities of wheat to the Russians, but he demands that the sale be made conditional upon a Soviet concession in the

political arena--viz., the withdrawal of remaining Russian troops from Cuba and/or the tearing down of the Berlin wall. You may remember that much the same proposal was advanced by Goldwater several months ago, when he advised that our ratification of the nuclear test-ban agreement be made contingent upon the same concessions. Whereas the proposal was totally indefensible at that time--since the matter at hand was far too important to our continued well-being to be burdened with gimmicks and conditions--it is now merely foolish. The fact that the Russians would not consider accepting such terms does not apparently faze Barry Goldwater, for he does not particularly like the idea of feeding the Communists anyway. The net effect of the imposition of his conditions would be a Soviet refusal to consummate the agreement, followed by considerable hardship on the part of the Russian people and the continued growth of grain surpluses at great expense to the American people. Even if the first result doesn't bother Barry Goldwater, the second surely ought to.

In San Antonio, Texas, on October 11th, Barry decided to devote his attention to the Kennedy Administration's foreign policy, particularly as it concerns Latin America. The highlight of his speech was an observation to the effect that he personally favored the overthrow of democratically-elected governments by military juntas (specifically, in the Dominican Republic and Honduras). "The Administration," he stated, curses the juntas who understand the Communist curse." The fact that the two governments in question were popularly elected and enjoyed popular support is apparently irrelevant to Barry Goldwater--after all, what is important is not that the peoples of Latin America be ruled by a government of their choosing, but rather that they be ruled by a government which professes the proper degree of anti-Communist sentiment.

A few days later in San Bernadino, California, Senator Goldwater expounded his own suggestions for a valid foreign aid program. He urged a "rifle approach" to foreign assistance, channeling the aid where it would have the greatest effect in assisting the West in its fight against Communism (as opposed to the quite separate goal of aiding the population). He proposed, that is to say, that foreign aid be distributed only where it can be utilized to buy friends for the United States.

By October 17th, the strain of a cross-country speaking tour must have been taking its toll of the senator's energies, for he was unable to devise any original criticisms when he spoke in Boston on that day. His most notable comment was the statement that, "Even the liberals have to recognize that what we have now in Washington is a would-be king and a want-to-be dynasty." This comment would have been more impressive had it not been so repetitious of what has been said by every politician and night-club comedian in the country.

All things considered, however, this two weeks' supply of speeches provides an excellent sampling of what is in store for the nation if fate should be so unkind as to decree the election of Senator Barry Goldwater to the Presidency. One cannot help but look forward to next November fearfully--for whatever common sense may dictate, I am not so confident that the American people are intelligent enough to reject this soft-spoken reactionary.

THE PURPOSE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY is the administration of justice.

This aim is accomplished only imperfectly when it is approached at all, but in the desire to reach this objective rests the value of our system of jurisprudence. In certain instances, however, the effect of the law can be to impede justice rather than to assist it; the power of the law can be utilized to destroy an individual rather than to protect him. Whenever this occurs, the particular facet of the law which has been perverted to abuse justice rather than promote it must be changed, so that the abuse may not continue

to occur.

In the early morning hours of July 21, 1961, three young Negroes were returning home from an evening of fishing in Montgomery County, Maryland. As they strolled through a wooded lovers lane, the three men encountered a parked automobile containing 21-year-old Stewart Foster, white, and his 16-year-old female companion. One of the Negroes, Joseph Johnson, approached the window of the automobile and requested a cigarette from Foster, a typical resident of a rural Maryland community. For reasons which are still not entirely understood, a heated argument broke out between the men, which quickly became a violent exchange. During the height of the brawl, the young girl fled into the woods. She was pursued and allegedly assaulted by Joseph Johnson and his companions, James and John Giles. The Giles brothers and Joseph Johnson were subsequently arrested, tried and convicted on a charge of criminal assault, and the three were sentenced to die in the gas chamber. Defense attorneys exhausted all avenues of appeal in their efforts to save the lives of their clients, but to no avail. Finally, in response to sympathetic public opinion, Governor J. Millard Tawes granted executive clemency and commuted the sentences of the three defendants to life imprisonment.

On the surface, this does not appear to be an extraordinary case. Unfortunately, our society is not yet sufficiently civilized to the point where the race of the accused is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case--and any case involving the alleged rape of a white girl by three Negroes will therefore be found on closer examination to possess extraordinary aspects. Even outside the South, the average white male experiences an inordinately strong emotional reaction to the idea of a Negro sexually assaulting a white woman, and it is difficult to believe that this reaction has been totally absent in affecting what has become known as the Giles case. It is unlikely that anyone will ever discover the precise extent to which racial prejudice influenced the outcome of the trial, but it must certainly be considered a factor in the conviction. The normal emotional reaction experienced by the white jurors was probably amplified by the defense offered for the three attackers: attorneys for the defense did not contest the fact that sexual relations had occurred between at least two of the defendants and the victim, but they contended that the intercourse had been desired and encouraged by the young woman. But this plea was not believable given the race of the defendants: the average white man cannot conceive of a white girl desiring sexual intimacy with a Negro, since the possibility is totally alien to everything he has been taught to believe.

But the prejudice of the jury, even if it could be proven conclusively to have existed, does not itself constitute sufficient cause to doubt the validity of the conviction. Prejudiced juries will render erroneous verdicts more often than unbiased panels of citizens, but the fact that the jury was biased against him does not indicate whether or not a defendant is actually guilty. In the Giles case, there are far better reasons for supposing that justice has been thwarted by the conviction of the defendants. The girl against whom the attack was purportedly committed had a previous history of what the law terms "immoral" activities; she was notably promiscuous and had a record of sexual offenses. Because of a tenet of Maryland law which decrees that juvenile court records must remain confidential, the record of her past transgressions was inadmissible as evidence. This provision of the law may often serve a useful purpose in protecting mischievous youngsters from the stigma of an open police record, but the application of that provision to this case was criminal. Three men were convicted of a capital crime almost solely on the testimony of a girl whose character was, to say the least, questionable--but the defense attorneys were not allowed

to present evidence which would have tended to discredit the testimony of the principal witness against their clients. Five members of the original jury have stated that, had they been aware of the girl's previous history of offenses and her apparent lack of scruples, they would have voted for acquittal.

A second manner in which the law was utilized in this case to impede justice has to do with an archaic rule regarding the judge's instructions to the jury. Only the antiquated legal codes of Maryland and Indiana allow the judge to inform the jury only of the possible verdicts they may deliver, ignoring the provisions which are contained in the American system of jurisprudence for the protection of the defendant. The jury in the Giles case was not instructed by the judge that the burden of proof in criminal cases is borne by the prosecuting attorney; nor did he trouble to mention that in the event of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the defendants were to be found innocent. The defense attorneys no doubt stressed these points in addressing the jury, but a jury would be likely to regard them as of greater significance if these fundamental concepts of law had been clearly stated by the judge. In most states, judges are compelled to instruct the jury in this manner, to make certain that the accused persons are granted the benefit of the doubt; not so in Maryland.

Even after the conclusion of the trial the constrictive regulations of Maryland's legal code operated to confound the defense attorneys. Under Maryland law, a petition for a new trial, accompanied by new evidence of significance, must be presented within three days of the original trial. This is a remarkably foolish regulation: if all of the evidence is not available at the trial, why should it be expected to come to light within three days after the close of the trial? Why not six days? Two weeks? In the Giles case, the defense attorneys did not acquire a reasonably complete record of the alleged victim's past activities until the deadline for motions for a new trial had passed. The records of juvenile court were still unavailable, of course, but by this time defense attorneys had compiled testimony relating to the girl's character from friends and acquaintances, as well as a statement from the girl's mother to the effect that she had admitted having intercourse with only two of the defendants. Since it was no longer possible to petition for a new trial through normal channels--and since the Court of Appeals in Maryland can review only the conduct of the original trial and not examine new evidence--executive clemency was the only thing that stood between the three Negroes and the gas chamber.

Governor Tawes was asked to commute the sentences of Joseph Johnson and the Giles brothers to eighteen-months, which was the time already served in prison--or at least to consider commuting the sentences to terms of a few years. This would have set a new precedent in Maryland rape cases, and could have been politically explosive. Refusing to grant clemency at all would have been highly unusual and probably politically unhealthy. It was not therefore difficult to predict that Mildard Tawes, the drab little man who inhabits the basement of Maryland's Statehouse, would choose the politically "safe" alternative--i.e., commute the sentences of the three Negroes to life imprisonment. The Baltimore Sun commented on this latest example of the Governor's scrupulous attention to the maintenance of his administration's mediocrity:

"Among those familiar with the rape case involving the two Giles brothers and Joseph E. Johnson Jr., there is little inclination today to praise Governor Tawes for having commuted to life imprisonment the death sentences which had hung over the heads of the three young men. Not in fifteen years had a death sentence been carried

out against a convicted rapist in Maryland. Governor Tawes himself had previously commuted death sentences assigned to two men. The Governor, then, did only what has become normal in Maryland when he stayed the hand of the executioner in this case."

This is what is known as executive mercy--though if the defendants happen to enjoy freedom, they may question the mercy of it.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF AN AGNOSTIC: An agnostic, according to my usually reliable dictionary (Webster's "New Practical"), is defined as "One who asserts the impossibility of any knowledge of God or of ultimate things." By this criterion, it would be highly inaccurate to apply that term to an individual of my philosophical persuasion--one of the principal tenets of my particular set of beliefs is, after all, that knowledge of all things is ultimately accessible to man. Even by the more widely recognized definition of the term--viz., that "agnostic" refers to an individual who possesses no opinion as to the existence or non-existence of a deity--I am no agnostic, for although I cannot assert unequivocally that there is no God, I rather doubt it. Perhaps the most accurate designation for a person of my pronounced skepticism would be "atheist", but so long as that category includes such zealots as Madalyn Murray (who could more appropriately be termed an "anti-theist"), I reserve the right to refuse to be associated with it. Besides, "atheism" is really not an accurate designation; I am not certain that there is no Supreme Being, though I suspect it.

Basically, I believe that even if there is a God (unlikely, but certainly possible), the fact is totally irrelevant to any realistic view of the world and its problems. Despite the predictions and claims of fervent theists, it seems improbable to me that this hypothetical God is affecting our world in any way; none of our problems appear to be in any immediate danger of being solved by divine intervention, just as since his origin the problems of man have not been solved by any force outside himself. The theist may claim, of course, that postulating a Supreme Being is the only reasonable method by which to account for the wonders of our earth. But he does this largely, I think, because he is ignorant of the fundamentals of science. True, postulating a deity does account for the so-called "natural wonders" of this planet. But that is just the trouble: postulating a deity will account for anything, since the qualities, forms and powers of a deity are by nature unlimited. Attributing various natural phenomenon to the actions of God is a panchreston, a logically unacceptable way to answer all questions without actually answering any. It would therefore seem reasonable to explain phenomenon in other terms wherever possible, and, in fact, science has been fulfilling this precise purpose for thousands of years.

To cite a commonly recognized example, the theist may claim that the existence of God explains the existence of life on this planet. In fact, it may well provide such an explanation. But the existence and perseverance of life on this planet may also be explained by non-theological means, which are neither hypothetical nor tentative--which are, in short, scientific facts. Religious fundamentalists may continue to deny the fact of evolution; but what was reasonable scientific debate in the nineteenth century becomes blatantly foolish rehashing of a patently ridiculous orthodoxy in the twentieth century. In the year 1963, we do not bother to argue with a man who refutes natural selection or biological change--we question his intelligence or, perhaps more properly, his sanity.

This is not to say that evolution is incompatible with theism--

only that it is incompatible with certain dogmas embraced by isolated sects. And when what is fact is contradicted by what is hypothesis, the latter--not the former--is discarded by rational individuals. Other than this, the fact of evolution is no more a large-scale refutation of theism than are the laws of thermodynamics: it is quite possible for a devoutly religious person to accept evolution, as many have. He may continue to believe that God guides every small step in the process of evolution, or he may contend that a divine being created the system of evolution and has allowed it to operate without intervention throughout the history of life on this planet. Neither of these beliefs can be positively or conclusively refuted, but both can be shown to be unnecessary. Given the fact of evolution as a self-regulating system utilizing random change to promote biological improvement by means of environmentally-oriented selection, divine intervention at each step becomes redundant; and given the fact that evolution is a process which is the natural and inevitable result of life conditions as we know them, divine creation likewise becomes redundant. Thus, the non-believer, remembering Occam's Razor, asks: If it isn't necessary, why believe it?

The same concept, of course, applies to all physical laws. If, e.g., the law of gravity is the inevitable result of matter arranged in a certain manner, then of what purpose is it to postulate a separate entity or conscious force to account for its existence? And if the law of gravity is sufficient to account for gravitational phenomenon, why is it necessary to believe that objects tend to gravitate toward the center of the earth because God causes them to do so?

The situation is slightly different in regard to natural phenomenon for which science presently advances no tenable explanation. Here the theist stands on firmer ground in attributing the phenomenon to his deity, since no one else is able to suggest a reasonable alternative. Nevertheless, I tend to argue against his belief that this explanation is the only possible explanation simply because it is the only plausible one to be suggested. We, as a race, are terribly young to expect to know the reasons for everything that happens in our world--and I, for one, do not believe that it is justifiable to bring into play a pantheon simply for the sake of explaining an otherwise inexplicable occurrence.

On the grounds that they are unnecessary and confusing, then, I reject most theological interpretations of events. This opposition to a religious attitude is purely academic: I occasionally argue against such interpretations, but I would not consider forcing anyone to discard them from his own beliefs. In many areas, however, religious beliefs possess consequences which are dangerous to society or to the individual components thereof, and in such cases my opposition is less passive. To the extent that a belief in a Supreme Being or an after-life relieves some of the misery of human existence--to the extent that such belief satisfies an inner, psychological need in many persons--I believe religion to be beneficial to society. But to the extent that such a belief acts in a manner calculated to pervert or suppress truth, and to the extent that such belief prevents society from acting to achieve its own goals, religion is a harmful quantity.

The first objection is philosophical in nature, and is accepted by only a small minority of individuals (most notably Julian Huxley and George Gaylord Simpson). I have often commented to theists with whom I was engaged in argument that our respective philosophies were surprisingly similar: both of us venerated an immaterial quality, the sole difference being that his God was called Jehovah or Allah, whereas mine was given the name Veritas. Most of my philosophical opposition to various premises of religion in general and specific sects in particular centers about their foul mistreatment of my own particular deity, Veri-

tas. Whenever a church makes an assertion ex cathedra without permitting free inquiry on the part of those affected by the assertion in an effort to discover truth, I consider that religious sect to have committed an ethical infraction. (The same criterion applies to a government or any other organization, of course, but only the effect of religious bodies is relevant in the context of this article.) I consider the negation of truth, to use the terms of theists, inherently immoral. Whenever a church interdicts criticism of its allegedly immutable laws or practical policies, whenever it imposes standards which are not assented to by those who are affected, whenever it attempts indoctrination as opposed to education, whenever it encourages dogmatism and prejudgements--then I consider that church, that doctrine to be participating in an inherently evil action. It makes no difference what specific policies or dicta are being encouraged in this manner. Even such an obviously reasonable injunction as "Thou shalt not kill" is wrong because it is asserted dogmatically rather than arrived at by a process of free discussion and argument. (I am not, of course, suggesting that the First Commandment be disobeyed because it is an ex cathedra judgement. But it should not be adhered to merely because of its allegedly divine origins--it should be obeyed because it is reasonable and proper to do so.)

The second objection to many religious commandments should be considered of more urgent significance by the majority of citizens: they have in many cases consequences which are dangerous to society as well as to the individual. To the extent that belief in one or another religion prevents a man from participating in an attempt to solve his own and society's problems, that belief is an evil. The most striking example which immediately comes to mind is adhered to by only a small minority: viz., the opinion, expressed by some passionate True Believers, that God will intercede to protect all honorable Christians if nuclear warfare ever becomes dangerously imminent. This is no doubt an extremely comforting belief, but to the extent that it prevents those individuals holding it from actively working for peace and nuclear disarmament, it is clearly dangerous. One can imagine with some horror the consequences should such an attitude ever become popular among government or military leaders. This, fortunately, is not the case; but despite the fact that the Christian Bible strongly advises against sitting passively and waiting for God to solve one's problems, there are Christians who hold such beliefs.

The Catholic attitude with respect to "artificial" contraception furnishes a somewhat more intrusive example of the same evil. The problem of over-population obviously exists and is becoming more urgent each year. The tenet of Catholic doctrine which prohibits artificial means of birth control may appear reasonable to a Catholic, and it is certainly a dogma which is sincerely believed to reflect the will of God; but it is dangerous. With the spectre of mass starvation hovering on the horizon, any theological belief which prevents vast segments of the human race from utilizing the most efficient, humane methods of contraception is exceedingly dangerous to the continued well-being not only of individuals but of entire races. (In this case, the situation is further complicated by the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is not content to interdict artificial contraception among its own members, but attempts also to utilize the mechanism of the law to enforce its particular taboo outside the sphere of its spiritual influence--a trait of the more militant sects of Christianity throughout history.) It is obviously irrelevant to claim that the Catholic Church does not really oppose contraception, but only certain methods; it opposes, in fact, any method which can be considered reasonably efficient, while allowing as a "solution" partial or total abstinence. This is a particularly fine example

of the grief caused by inflexible dicta, to believers as well as non-believers. It is obviously painful for the majority of Catholics to envision the mass starvation which they may be helping to promote; indeed, the members of the Catholic hierarchy are better acquainted with the problem of over-population than the average atheist, and must experience a very considerable degree of mental anguish when they are constantly reminded of available solutions which they are compelled to oppose. Yet, no matter how much they suffer on account of the misery inflicted by over-population, most Catholics doggedly refuse to abandon their immutable natural law.

This attitude is wrong not only because it invites disaster in the realm of practical application, but also, in my opinion, because it is ethically unacceptable. The dogma is ethically bad precisely because it is asserted unequivocally as an inflexible law which must be enforced regardless of its value in a changing world, because it is a dogma imposed from above rather than a reasonable judgement arrived at during the free exchange of ideas.

On these grounds, then, rests my opposition to religion: first, that in many cases it either contradicts what science discovers to be true, or needlessly complicates physical or "natural" laws by intruding the superfluous concept of divine intervention; and second, that many specific facets of religious orthodoxy, as well as the concept of religion itself (by its uncritical acceptance of questionable premises), perverts or suppresses truth. It should be unnecessary to add at this point that the second (and most damning) objection applies also to atheism wherever it becomes militant, as well as to many other sectarian ideas and ideals. But the sharing of the evil by others does not absolve organized religion from its culpability.

--Ted Pauls

"Time and time again, the Communist coup d'état of February, 1948, in Czechoslovakia has been cited as evidence of Soviet military aggression. Yet the facts are that there were no Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Communist take-over. The coup d'état was managed by the Czech Communists themselves, who constituted the largest political party and parliamentary group as a result of the free election of 1946. There is no doubt that the U.S.S.R. spurred them on and gave them advice. It is true that local political arrangements begun by the Red Army during its comparatively brief occupation of Slovakia and part of the Czech provinces toward the end of the war helped lay the groundwork for the Communists' success. There were, of course, Soviet troops on the Eastern borders of Czechoslovakia, as there were American troops on the Western borders. But perhaps more important than any of these factors in the success of communism in Czechoslovakia was the traumatic experience of Munich. To many non-Communist Czechs--who may have since changed their minds--affinity with the Soviet Union was simply preferable to affinity with the West. The bitter fruit of pre-war anti-Soviet policies was being reaped. That a nation with the fine democratic past and democratic possibilities of Czechoslovakia fell to communism is deplorable. But whatever it showed, it did not show evidence of Soviet military aggression." --Prof. Fred Warner Neal, in "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union".

"A demagogue, like a deity, must be all things to all men. Since no one can actually inflame a mob by convincing them of something, the astute demagogue must convince each individual that he and they agree, and that the speaker is simply translating into clear terms the philosophy of the listener. Hitler did not convince a mob; he focused it." --Daniel Marbury, in "The Movers: Pericles to Goebbels".

DAVE HULAN :: 17417 VANOWEN ST., APT. #1 :: VAN NUYS, CALIF.

Re your comments on intelligence: I disagree. Of course, it's a matter of semantics--if you want to define "intelligence" as you say, it's your privilege, but if you do so then you are not using the word as it is used by most people. Granting that broadly speaking an intelligent person is more likely to be broad-minded than an unintelligent one (a premise I consider probable), the correlation is certainly not 1:1. You admit yourself that intelligent people sometimes are narrow-minded in some ways; equally, unintelligent people can be surprisingly broad-minded at times. Any characteristic of this sort, while a subject worthy of study, cannot be used as a defining characteristic. An analogy: Most people who use makeup are women, and most women use makeup. But can one thereby define "woman" as "a person who uses makeup"? One can--but one is going to confuse others in talking about women. A defining characteristic must be possessed universally by the in-group and not at all by the out-group; otherwise it is inadequate. I can name a large number of quite narrow-minded men who are nevertheless generally considered intelligent--for instance, St. Paul, Ignatius Loyola, John Calvin, Oliver Cromwell, John C. Calhoun... I could go on, but that should be enough. For that matter, Isaac Newton--certainly one of the half-dozen greatest scientific minds in history--was remarkably narrow-minded about some things. You may, if you like, define these men out of the class of the intelligent--but you'll be defining a new concept, "intelligence/Ted Pauls", not giving elucidation to the meaning usually attached to the word.

Bill Christian starts off making good sense, but loses his bearings about midway through his third paragraph. His difficulty lies mostly in failing to understand the South--a not uncommon failing among people who have never lived there, or even some who have. He generalizes far too readily about "the southern white"--an individual no more uniform in such ways than "the Negro" who is also a subject of stereotypes on both sides of the political fence. Relatively few southern whites outside of Mississippi and the "Black Belts" of Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana have any such sense of the righteousness of segregation as he imputes to them. The majority favor segregation, yes--but for specific, personal, more or less selfish reasons, not because they think it's right. Bill

the
great
debate

LETTERS

says passive resistance won't work--but it has worked, in Nashville, Memphis, Atlanta, Huntsville and numerous other southern cities. You seldom read about such cities, because peaceful integration isn't "news", but it's happened and it's happening more and more. Even in Birmingham the violence has been due to a very small number of violent racists; there have been no mobs or race riots, as would seem inevitable if the opposition were as strong and widespread as Bill says it is.

No, I may differ with certain particular actions, as I have done and doubtless will do again, but I feel that by and large the integration movement is proceeding at about the right pace, now. Things went too slowly from 1954 until 1960 or 1961, but since then they have been going about as fast as they can be pushed without provoking more violence than is justifiable--which I consider good pacing. Within ten years there will be only isolated pockets in the South that are any worse than the North is now, and in some areas things may even be better. Racial prejudice will die a hard death if it ever dies at all; equality by law should be achieved rather soon.

What, incidentally, is your opinion regarding the CORE protests in Los Angeles (and elsewhere) about de facto segregation? My opinion is that they're silly. Certainly school district lines should not be drawn with racial ideas in mind, nor should the schools in a predominantly Negro neighborhood be physically or educationally worse than those in white areas, but to say that a school with over 50% Negroes is de facto segregated and that students should be transported miles if necessary to "correct racial imbalance" is to my way of thinking just as racist as de jure segregation. Do you defend these demands? And if so, how? I've never heard what I consider a sensible argument for them. (The problem of de facto segregation is simply a facet of the discrimination against Negroes in employment and housing which exists in large northern cities. As long as there are Negro ghettos, there will be predominantly Negro schools; as long as there are "white only" neighborhoods, there will be predominantly white schools. It is unreasonable to expect the public schools to correct what are, in fact, injustices outside the schools, particularly when doing so requires the expensive transportation of students across school district lines. CORE should concentrate on fair employment practices and equal opportunity in housing; when these problems are fully solved, de facto school segregation will no longer be a significant factor. In Baltimore the problem is slightly different, and the complaints are, in this instance, justified. In Baltimore, over-crowded schools are "solving" the problem by adopting half-day sessions, so that one group of children attend school in the morning, another in the afternoon. As a result of the inevitable clustering of Negroes in the center of the city and the gravitation of middle-class whites to the outskirts, most of the decrepit, over-crowded schools are predominantly Negro, whereas the modern and spacious institutions are predominantly white. This, in effect, discriminates against Negroes--the majority of Negro children attend school for half a day, while the majority of white children attend classes the entire day. In this particular case, I believe that the demands of the protesting integration organizations are justified: transporting a few thousand children from the center of the city to the outskirts will cause a more even distribution of students, hence making the most efficient use of available facilities. The fact that the children being transported are Negroes doesn't affect this, though it opens the way for accusations of forcible integration against the school authorities.))

Odd--most of my school history texts rather praised the Amerinds and were somewhat caustic toward Custer and the treaty-breaking habits of the United States. I wonder if part of the reason might be that I

went to high school in the South, and most of the "heroes" of the Indian Wars were previously Union officers--who were hardly glorified in textbooks prepared by southern universities.

In response to Breen--it seems interesting to note that, although numerous tribes manage to survive without benefit of war or oppression, they all seem to do so by occupying an environment which is unappealing to the average man, and that their numbers are inevitably small--as are their average life-spans. Perhaps there is something about the human organism which requires the stimulus of war and/or oppression before it can make progress. I'm not asserting this--I'm presenting it as a possibility to be considered. It seems to be a favorite habit of anthropologists to hold that, say, the Adamanese and the Western Europeans are both "successful" because both cultures exist, and to ignore the question of which is more successful.

I make an assertion: the successfulness of a culture is measured by its capacity for survival. It has nothing to do with the welfare of the individuals living under it, necessarily. The most successful possible culture may be an absolute monarchy, or anarchy, or syndicalism, or any of a variety of other alternatives. No one can tell now. Eventually either the earth will be blown up--which will prove that no human culture was ultimately successful--or one culture (with local variations) will dominate the earth. And that will be the most successful type of culture, because it was the most successful type. Western European civilization seemed well on its way to proving itself best until recently; now there are indications that the hybrid Western-Byzantine culture of the Soviet Union may come out on top, or the hybrid Western-Chinese culture of Soviet China. It seems inevitable, however, that there will be strong elements of the Western European culture in any future society. Conversely, I doubt that it will owe much to the Eskimos, Camaiura Indians, Polynesians, or Australian aborigines. Thus, while war and combativeness in general may not be inevitable because of human nature, it appears likely that because of the nature of things--as-they-are, a culture without them will never be of importance except to anthropologists or as examples for pacifists to point to and say, "See? It can be done!" (The statement that the most successful type of culture will dominate the earth is just as much a tautology as is "survival of the fittest" (i.e., survival of those best fit to survive). The question still remains, what are the qualities which caused this dominant culture to be so very successful? As for the unimportance of lesser cultures: it is true, in a very real sense, that no comparison is possible between the Adamanese and Western European peoples beyond the statement that they are both successful to the extent that they are able to survive. Anthropologists do not assert this egalitarian view of cultures because they're broad-minded fellows, but rather because they recognize that a point-by-point comparison of cultures occupying radically different environments can only be unfair. To the extent that the Western European and Adamanese cultures have progressed within the limitations of their respective environments, both cultures may be considered to be equally progressive. Any further qualitative comparison must take account of the greater opportunity of the one culture as opposed to the restricted horizons of the other. There is obviously a qualitative distinction between the two cultures in question; but both are equally progressive, inasmuch as both have progressed about as far as they could have given their differing environments.)

Regarding abortion: I don't recall the specific instance which started the discussion, but I might as well give my ideas. Basically, I am against abortion. I recognize one justification: if competent medical evidence indicates that continuation of pregnancy is dangerous to the mother's life, or as a minimum is likely to result in permanent

physical damage to her, then I will say that an abortion is justifiable. However, most states do permit abortion on such grounds. ({Suppose that in the opinion of competent psychiatrists continuation of pregnancy would result in serious mental or emotional consequences to the prospective mother? Would you allow abortion under those circumstances?}) Otherwise, I disagree with a contention that abortion should be legalized so that women won't die from being butchered by quacks. This is like saying murder should be legalized so that it can be placed in the hands of efficient professionals instead of clumsy amateurs. It is one thing to choose abortion as the lesser of evils when it is a question of saving a life; it is another to advocate legalizing something which is basically wrong so that those who want to do it can do it without fear of punishment.

Those women--did they seek abortion because they really needed one, or just because they didn't want the baby? If the latter, then I say they died not because of bad laws, but because they wished to do a dangerous act which the law properly prohibits. People who violate speed laws sometimes die; not because of the law--because they did something foolish. ({Your analogy is questionable because one would have exactly the same chance of being killed by speeding even if there were no speed laws; this does not apply in the case of abortions. An abortion, performed properly, is among the safest of medical operations.}) There is no more necessity for people to get an abortion (except as I have indicated) than there is to drive 90-mph. People who do such things have to take their chances.

There is no certain evidence that a foetus is a person--as you say, it is debatable. For this reason, where there is a clear and present danger to an acknowledged person (the mother), abortion is justifiable. But it is equally uncertain that the foetus is not a person. Compare, please, the number of deaths from botched abortions in the U.S. per capita to the total number of abortions in Japan per capita--are you willing to lay odds that long that a foetus isn't human? I'm not. I doubt there's much hope of convincing you, but equally there's little of convincing me. A question such as the probability of a foetus being human is something one must decide for himself, and no one is likely to change anyone's mind about it. ({Actually, the prospect of converting me to an anti-abortion position is not so bleak as you might think. My original advocacy of abortion was stated with customary gusto, which may have obscured the fact that it was an extremely tentative position. I still believe that the school teacher whose case inspired this discussion was justified in obtaining an abortion, and should not have been restricted by law from retaining competent medical assistance. I think that your concept of what constitutes justifiable cause for terminating a pregnancy is too narrow--it fails to include the destruction of a teacher's social position and career, it fails to include prevention of congenital deformity of gross proportions (the thalidomide cases), and, most damning of all, it apparently fails to consider emotional damage, which is often more injurious than the "permanent physical damage" which in your view justifies abortion. On the other hand, I am willing to concede that the abortion laws of Japan, et al., are too liberal. Also, I will now admit that inability to properly care for a child (as in the case of the widow whose demise was also considered in the original article) is not sufficient justification for undertaking an abortion, since financial and other aid is readily available in this semi-welfare state.})

"Divine law [is] not obeyed on the strength of its holy origin, but rather because it is believed to be right." This statement is dubious when applied as generally as that. Certainly it is true for many people. On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of conversion; it

frequently happens (especially in the early days of a religion) that a person is converted to the religion and then changes his ideas of what is right because of the teachings of the religion. And in most cases the two are indistinguishable--a chicken-or-egg argument--because from the beginning "divine law" and "what is right" are equated in his training. (It seems to make a good deal more sense to say that a person is converted from one religion to another because his ideas of what is right have changed, not vice versa. If a Methodist becomes converted to Catholicism, it is because his faith in Methodist doctrine has been replaced by a belief in Catholic dogma; a man doesn't first shift his allegiance and then gradually change his ideas to conform to his new label. And if "divine law" is equated in childhood training with "what is right", it is done in order to justify faith in the divine decree by aligning it with ethical rightness--which supports my original contention.))

I don't particularly like Kennedy, but I like Goldwater even less. Unfortunately, there is no one in sight whom I like very much better. Lyndon Johnson is probably the man prominent in politics who would make the best President; unfortunately, his southern origin makes his nomination or election quite unlikely even after J.F.K. has served his constitutional two terms.

I sit back to watch Si Stricklen get mauled by your readers. Actually, what he says is quite hypothetical and most of it I could say myself--but I bet he doesn't get away with it. Not with that Georgia address...

"That patriotism may degenerate into a vice is shown by the invention of a name for the vice: chauvinism. It is a name for boastful and truculent group self-assertion. It overrules personal judgement and character, and puts the whole group at the mercy of the clique which is ruling at the moment. It produces the dominance of watchwords and phrases which take the place of reason and conscience in determining conduct. The patriotic bias is a recognized perversion of thought and judgement against which our education should guard us." --William Graham Sumner, in "Folkways".

FRED LERNER :: 926 FURNALD HALL, COLUMBIA COLLEGE :: NEW YORK 27, N.Y.

The feature of Kipple which I like the most is the attention paid by you and your correspondents to science fiction, in the context of a general debate on matters political, religious, philosophical and moral. I have always been especially interested in the role of science fiction as prophecy, not of what will come, but of what should or could come. Heinlein's stories on religion ("Stranger in a Strange Land", "The Day After Tomorrow/Sixth Column", "If This Goes On..."), the many stories in Analog about the military and about politics, and some of the "mood" pieces in The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction are examples of this. The relationship, if any, between a person's actual beliefs and those which he appears to hold in a story have been oft-times discussed, especially in the case of Heinlein, where the subject is of the greatest importance. I have heard a lot about Heinlein's politics, and now that this subject has gotten into Kipple, isn't it about time that somebody summed up the whole matter for the benefit of newcomers? I should like to know the whole story of G.M. Carr's "clipping", of Heinlein and the Patrick Henry League, ktp. I should also like to know just why Harry Warner warned Tom Perry not to quote from Heinlein's letter. Just what is this all about?

Re public schools, parochial schools, and aid therefor: How about

abolishing the public schools altogether, and leaving education to private and parochial schools? I'm not being facetious--though I don't claim it would work right now. But in a few years, say, ten or twenty, it would be feasible. This way the various denominations would establish schools, and there would be four or five systems across the nation: Roman Catholic, Baptist, "High Protestant" (Presbyterian-Methodist-Episcopalian-Lutheran), Jewish, and "Liberal" (Reform Jewish, Unitarian Universalist, Humanist, Ethical Culture), as well as private schools within and without these religious groupings. This would pretty much destroy the "neighborhood school" concept, and substitute religious separation for racial discrimination. True, the "melting pot" aspect of public schools would disappear--but how much of it really exists these days anyway, especially in the suburbs? This way parents would be able to bring up their children within a certain ethical/moral/religious framework, without facing competition from a school system whose outlook is different. I know that this jeopardizes the child's free choice, but my feeling is this: I'm going to bring up my children in the way I think is right, and will indoctrinate them with the Ideals I think are right. I want my children to attend a school based on similar principles.

"Those who call scientific contraception "artificial" call the repressive mode /total or partial abstinence/ "natural". The logic of this position comes in an unbroken line of descent from Tertullian, a Roman ecclesiastical lawyer of the third century A.D. Tertullian defined as "unnatural", and hence as morally wrong, the practice of circumcision, acting in plays, shaving the face, and the wearing of dyed fabrics. The last proscription gives the show away. Did Tertullian suppose that undyed fabrics grew on trees? The only consistency in seventeen centuries of polemics against the "unnatural" is the identification of recent technological advances as unnatural. One suspects that there was a time in the prehistory of man when the milking of cows for human food was looked upon as utterly abhorrent. Indeed: to those who have the imagination to see the entire sequence of acts as if it had never been seen before, there is something decidedly "unnatural" in a man's manipulating a cow's mammary glands and then drinking the exudate, which was undeniably intended by nature for a suckling calf, and not for a grown man... But then, it is dangerous to think logically." --Garrett Hardin, in "Nature and Man's Fate".

TOM PERRY :: P.O. BOX 1284 :: OMAHA, NEBRASKA

Thanks for sending me the copy of Heinlein's newspaper advertisement. My own efforts to obtain a copy of it failed; I wrote the Free Press in Colorado Springs, describing the ad and telling them it was run sometime in 1958 by Heinlein, and they sent back a picture of an ad placed by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy! That is apparently the plea to which Heinlein's ad was a reply.

Having seen it, I'm afraid I continue to disagree with both you and Walt Willis as to the nature of it. It seems more to me like a creed than a screed. Though you say it "is no proper part of any rational opposition to disarmament", I think Heinlein mentions a number of arguments that ought to be considered in any serious evaluation of the question. You will notice that he does not oppose all disarmament: he specifically opposes abandoning a nuclear deterrent separately from "conventional" weapons, and stopping nuclear tests without safeguards that the Russians would also cease testing. Both these things were supported by the previous ad and both, it seems to me, are at least ques-

tionable. ((I had operated under the assumption that your initial hesitancy to credit Walt's criticisms of Heinlein was due to your admiration for the man. I must admit that I am scandalized by your continued defense of Heinlein's manifesto, now that you have had the opportunity to read it. His petition is clearly in opposition to the principle of disarmament as well as to the specific proposals of SANE (he stops just short of bluntly stating, "I oppose all disarmament"), and consists largely of a call to arms against compromise. His willingness to risk racial suicide (which even he admits is "almost certain" if Russia were to use high-yield nuclear weapons) is stated explicitly, and cannot be misunderstood even if a conscientious effort is made to do so. Perhaps your persistent refusal to condemn Heinlein's flag-waving display of narrow-mindedness is an exercise in tolerance, but if so, allow me to suggest that tolerance is not always appropriate. No one seeks to defend in the name of tolerance George Lincoln Rockwell's racism as rational opposition to integration; likewise, it is a misapplication of tolerance to defend Heinlein's chauvinism as rational opposition to disarmament.))

It's true that the appeal is an emotional one--since the desire to survive and to be free are emotions--but whether it is, as you say, "emotionalistic" (i.e., unduly emotional) is something best left to individual judgement. I do not happen to think so.

Concerning what you refer to as "a nasty little job of character assassination", it seems to me that Heinlein has clearly rejected the common Bircher reasoning that anyone who happens to agree with the Communists on an issue perforce is one. You must assume that readers will infer the opposite, but if they do, they are being stupider than anyone has any business supposing. ((Despite my reputation for being notably tactless, I have no wish to antagonize a new reader of Kipple by questioning his comprehension of a document written in clear English. However, it seems quite apparent that unless we are discussing two distinctly different petitions (and you acknowledge receipt of the one I mailed), something of the sort must be complicating this argument. The manifesto which you describe rejects the common John Birch Society reasoning that one who agrees with a Communist position is a Communist; the petition I read speaks of "possibly" loyal members of SANE, who are "Communist-line propagandists" circulating "the rankest sort of Communist propaganda" and as a result delighting Premier Khrushchev. Heinlein does not even allow the possibility that the signers of the SANE petition are coincidentally supporting a Communist position: "It is," he states, "no accident that this manifesto follows the Communist line" (my underlining). This masterpiece of innuendo incorporated into the document indicates to me that, far from rejecting the John Birch Society reasoning, the petition utilizes it with a vengeance. It may be a shade more subtle than the average Robert Welch harangue, but it differs in no other significant particular.))

Whatever I think of this document, however, I must say that I respect Willis' right to hold his own opinion of it, and yours, and anyone else's. I hope I can ask the same of you.

This brings up something I've been meaning to comment on--the increasing difficulty that "conservatives" and "liberals" in this country experience in discussing their disagreements. Both these groups, I think, are developing an insularity that may be dangerous. The right of free speech loses some of its value when an atmosphere of free discussion is lacking, for whatever reason. I'm reminded that no overt act by the Republicans preceded the secession of southern states a century ago; the southerners simply felt there was no use in trying to deal with the new administration.

I think this insularity is added to by those who imply that any--

one who holds opinions different from their own is a hypocrite. This attitude has been evident in Kipple in past issues, not entirely in your own writings. But I suspect that most people who believe in unpopular causes--segregation, for instance--do so sincerely, however misguided they may be. (I refer here to the common southerner, and not the cynical politicians like Barnett and Wallace.) To call them all "apologists", as was done recently in Kipple, is to discourage them from trying to present their side of it; and denied the feeling that he can discuss his opinions freely, a segregationist is more likely to turn to violent means of enforcing his will. Thus the chance that he would submit to a democratic defeat of his ideas after a fair hearing is lessened. (Adherents of unpopular causes such as segregation, et al., certainly possess the right to freely discuss their opinions, and it is a right which I have constantly defended. I, on the other hand, possess the right to criticize those opinions with whatever terms appear to me as appropriate.)

(The word "apologist" is one of those semantically loaded ones that tell more about the attitude of the user than about the thing he is referring to. When an apologist is on your side he is a defender of the faith. Could you stomach the term "apologist for integration", for example, or "apologist for foreign aid"?) (One of the few valid criticisms of liberalism voiced by William F. Buckley in his child's garden of straw men, "Up From Liberalism", is that modulation has become the order of the day in intellectual circles due to the influence of the liberal's relativistic philosophy. An argument between liberal intellectuals today possesses all of the interest and suspense of a duel with wet pingpong balls at twenty paces. Says Buckley: "...another factor that militates against purposive discourse is the developing taboo first on strong opinions, second on their expression in relentless language." I belong to the Buckley school of political debate, which may often bruise courtesy but can never be accused of equivocating...)

"The Supreme Court is confronted with the unenviable task of defining laws in matters affecting religion and government. It has at its disposal a regrettably limited, tersely expressed, and by no means unambiguous set of legal categories, for those provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments supply but limited direction. Every decision the Justices have formulated in the past fifteen years has been read by some as a shameful concession to organized religion, and by others as a further reinforcement of the total secularization of our culture. The result has been that some disputants were dissatisfied, clarity was only momentarily achieved, and our jurists remained doomed to await another opportunity to rethink their positions and decide again. This, of course, is how the law grows. But it is also the means by which the people's lack of clarity is perpetuated and their refusal to accept responsibility is deepened." --Arthur Cohen, in "Religion and the Free Society".

L. SPRAGUE DE CAMP :: 278 HOTHORPE LANE :: VILLANOVA, PA., 19085

I fear I must disagree with you on civil defense and fallout shelters. This is not because I believe that, in the state of the military art, any nuclear-armed nation can win a war with another. The best you can do is to take the other guy with you. Such nations are like two men, enemies, locked in a small room and each armed with a hand grenade. If either pulls the pin on his grenade he can kill the other, but he will probably be killed in the explosion himself. Even if he survives his own blast, he cannot stop the other from throwing his grenade,

too, before the first bomb goes off.

Nor would I say that shelters would save all or even most of the population in a nuclear war. You can't protect anybody at ground zero unless you dig down hundreds of feet.

But, when we look at the anti-civil defense arguments you quoted, they are merely expressions of emotion--a kind of suicidal masochism--unrelated to the real situation. You quotes say that "our only hope is peace", that "the only defense is the absolute non-use of the bomb", that we should spend the money "removing the causes of war: ignorance, suspicion, greed", and making "a realistic effort to find a way and means of living together..."

But saying that "the only way to avoid nuclear war is to have peace" is like saying that "the only way to avoid death is to live forever". A nice deal, but how? An American can perhaps do a little to keep his own government from warlike adventures. But, in a world of sovereign states, the people or government of one country can do absolutely nothing to stop the government of another from making war if it puts its mind to it.

We went through all this at the time of the rise of Hitler. The British and French governments of the 1930's tried every method to pacify Hitler--compromise, flattery, cajolery, argument, reasoning, exhortation, admonishing, warning, threats, bluff--and Hitler went right ahead and made war when it suited him. The British Labor Party of the time made itself even more ridiculous than the ruling Tories by demanding on the one hand that Hitler be stopped and on the other voting against the armaments that were the only means of stopping him.

Although you might think that nobody shut in a room with a grenade would be so crazy as to pull the pin, history shows that plenty of people would do so if they couldn't have their own way in everything. And there is no way by which the people of one country can keep a Hitler, a Caligula, or a Francesco Lopez (Paraguay) from coming into power in another. Such a man is perfectly willing to pull that pin to make the world a stage for his private *Götterdämmerung*. Mao Tze-Tung is on record as saying it's all right with him if half the world's population is killed in another world war, because the survivors would all be Communists, who would set about "building the most beautiful civilization the world has yet seen." Not even world-wide democracy would assure peace. The bloodiest aggressors in Periclean Athens and Robespierrean France were the extreme Democrats. (It is impossible to discuss foreign policy in this nuclear age without taking account of the qualitative difference between nuclear and conventional warfare. No era in human history has been faced with the possibility of a war which can eradicate entire populations in a few hours. To compare compromise with the Russians to Munich, et al., is to overlook this distinction. Khrushchev is no madman (nor is Mao, whose missile-rattling may well be the empty talk characteristic of those in no position to carry out their threats); the Russians will continue to be tough, ruthless diplomats, but they will not commit suicide by unleashing a nuclear holocaust unless they see no alternative to a major defeat. To work for peace does not mean to surrender or to appease; but neither does it mean to dig holes in the ground and make the idea of nuclear warfare more acceptable. You are of course correct when you point out that the peoples of one nation cannot affect in a positive manner the actions of another country. But one government can certainly cause another to react to certain actions on the part of the first, and one government can seek areas of negotiation with another. We could not prevent a nuclear war if the Russians decided to unleash one, but recent events indicate that Russia is no more anxious to participate in such a war than we ourselves are--which renders invalid any analogy between the Soviet Union and Germany under Hitler.)

As for war being caused by ignorance or poverty, people forget that in the 1930's Germany was the most literate and prosperous nation in Europe; and that Japan, although poor by European standards, was the most literate and prosperous nation in Asia. The only people to whom war is unknown are pre-agricultural hunters and food gatherers, like the Eskimos and the Kalihari Bushmen, among whom violence is limited to an occasional murder. The significant factors seem to be that these folks are so thinly scattered that contacts among groups are few, and that they live so close to starvation that they don't have time and energy for fighting. War, then, is the normal reaction to the rise of civilization, with its multifarious human contacts and its accumulations of stealable property.

Of course, if we had a real world state controlling all the world's armed forces, something could perhaps be done about war. But we don't, and the prospects for getting one are a lot dimmer than those of putting a man on the moon and getting him back. Perhaps things will be different in a hundred years, but in the meantime we have to live in the world as it is, not as we should like it to be.

Faced by determined aggression, then, a nation's choice may be, not simply war or (by some miraculous sleight-of-hand of statesmanship) peace. It may be between war and surrender. But even abject surrender does not guarantee peace. One can easily imagine circumstances under which, if we surrendered to the Russians, the Chinese would clobber us, and vice versa. The minor central European nations who were fought over in World War Two can testify to this.

But what's the good of shelters, if they don't shelter 100%? Simply to assure more survivors if worse comes to worse and, despite every effort by the United States to avoid war, the nation is attacked. This may not happen, but then again it may, and there is no sure way to avoid it. People who claim there is should make such a method known as a matter of duty. Of course the blitz might be so severe as to kill everybody. But then again it might not, and there is no way of knowing short of an actual experiment. It is hard utterly to exterminate any numerous and adaptable species.

We go to a lot of trouble and expense to save the lives of single men or small groups caught in accidents and disasters. If shelters would make the difference between, say, ten and twenty million survivors, who shall say that an effort that saves ten million people was not worthwhile, or even that it was somehow immoral? To argue that we ought not to try to save anybody because there would be no need for it if peace prevailed is like saying we ought not to have fire-engines because if everybody were careful with matches, there would be no fires. Very true; but it is a fact that some folk are careless with matches, just as it is a fact that reckless adventurers and paranoid fanatics sometimes rule nations, and there is no way to stop such people from making war if the mood so takes them. Or, if there is, I have yet to hear it. (If the situation were as simple and clear-cut as that, any effort which resulted in the saving of human lives would be justified. But when an effort intended to save a few lives threatens the liberty, security, and existence of a great many people, another dimension is added. I do not object to the concept of civil defense where it can be useful (i.e., in areas far removed from targets, and not directly dependent upon target areas for the necessities of life), but the mass civil defense program envisioned by some segments of the government is a hoax. The fact that a comprehensive program utilizes vast sums of money which could be put to other uses (e.g., education) and furthermore introduces government control and regimentation into heretofore free areas is only a minor argument against the program. Infinitely worse, there is the fact that the sort of civil defense program apparently planned by the govern-

ment materially increases the possibility of a nuclear war occurring. The most obvious reason for this is that the Soviet Union could interpret a frantic shelter-building program on our part as an indication that we were planning to launch an attack, and consequently decide to strike first in order to gain an advantage. Less obvious--but ultimately more dangerous--is the psychological effect of apparent security, the presumption of partial or total protection against the ravages of nuclear destruction: characteristically, a man who believes that he possesses some measure of protection against the weapons of his enemies will tend to become over-confident and less willing to negotiate. I am reminded of Achilles' magnificent courage in battle, bravery which resulted largely from the fact that Achilles believed himself impervious to harm. If the proposed mass shelter program becomes a reality, the ordinarily rash American will become even more belligerent--nothing so quickly inspires courage as the belief that one is safe. In this case, however, much of the protection is illusory. Certainly the residents of small towns safely distant from prime target areas may be protected by fallout shelters; perhaps ten million lives can be saved in this manner. But the Civil Defense organization is stocking shelters in such ridiculous locations as downtown Baltimore or Wall Street in New York. Casualty and blast statistics are deliberately understated, genetic and other effects are ignored completely, and in general the prospect of a nuclear war is rendered palatable to the American public. To the extent that this instills a false sense of security into the American people, it is wrong and should be opposed; nothing is more dangerous at this time than an underestimate of the results of nuclear warfare, a casual belief that it is something that may mildly inconvenience the nation for a few weeks, after which normal life may be resumed. To an honest civil defense program, one that stressed the limited usefulness of shelters and did not encourage false hopes, I would have no objection--but the present one is so far from being honest that it would be laughable to any intelligent observer, if the gravity of the situation did not preclude laughter.~)

"If we set our minds to it we could probably slaughter nine-tenths of mankind and still find a well-populated world after the lapse of some centuries, like a forest regenerated after a fire, although the pattern of society would have changed. But the horror of atomic war is far more than the reign of death and misery it would bring. It is the threat to all posterity and not even to that of man alone. I do not suppose it would mean the end of planetary life, even human; but most of surviving mankind and much of the animal life and the earth's vegetation would be so affected where it matters most that future generations would exhibit increasing degrees of abnormality and would eventually disappear--monsters inheriting the worst consequences of biological sin."--N. J. Berrill, in "Man's Emerging Mind".

MARTY HELGESEN :: 11 LAWRENCE AVE. :: MALVERNE, NEW YORK, 11565

This weekend the Diem regime was overthrown. The reports are still rather confused and no one knows exactly what has happened or what the results will be. I hope this will mean an increase in civil liberties for the Vietnamese and, more important, a more vigorous prosecution of the war. I say more important because the prime danger to the wellbeing of the Vietnamese was and is the danger of a Communist victory. In questioning this in #46, you suggest a comparison between Belgrade and Saigon. It would be far more pertinent and far more instructive in the necessity of winning the war to compare Saigon and Han-

oi. ({The principal problem of the Vietnamese people is oppression by a totalitarian government. The alleged qualitative distinction between a rightist totalitarian government and a Communist totalitarian government is one made by American politicians, but probably not by the people concerned. Also, it is inadvisable to consider increasing the liberty of the populace and winning the guerilla war as separate problems in Vietnam, for they are by no means rigidly separated. The Diem regime was not often militarily negligent in prosecuting the war; the reason so little progress was made was the direct result of the dissatisfaction of the populace. No government can hope to be victorious in any sort of guerilla warfare unless it is supported by the majority of the populace; conversely, guerilla activity can not exist where there is widespread support of the existing order. Consequently, increasing the civil liberties of the Vietnamese is not a secondary consideration after a more vigorous war effort, but is, in fact, the only realistic way in which a lasting victory may be obtained.})

John Boardman: You say that you and Earle Stevens reject non-violence because you have lived in the South and have seen segregation in operation. The chief apostle of non-violence, Dr. King, and his Negro followers have also "lived on the firing line in the South". Furthermore, they did not merely see this vicious system, they suffered under it. Yet, to their credit, they do not advocate lynching whites.

You, Ted, have quite rightly been defending the principle that a man is assumed innocent until proven guilty. Yet in #47 you say that abortion is justified so long as there is a reasonable basis for the assumption that a foetus isn't a person. Wouldn't it be more in keeping with the above principle to say that a foetus is assumed human (and therefore morally unkillable) unless it is proved non-human? ({As my comments to Dave Mulan probably indicate, I have revised my position to a considerable extent. While still uncertain as to whether or not the foetus may be considered human, I am now willing to defend abortion only when there is a clear danger to the well-being of the mother if it is not undertaken. I suspect that my conception of a "clear danger" may be considerably broader than yours, just as it is broader than Dave's, but we are now agreed as to the principles involved: abortion is justified only in special circumstances.})

You suggest that a foetus is human when it is able to survive outside the body of the mother. However, the possibility of the survival of a premature baby often depends upon the medical technology available. Would you say that the product of a premature birth would be human if the birth were to take place in a modern hospital but non-human if the same birth were to take place in a mountain cabin?

I am quite willing to consider the mothers whose deaths sparked this discussion of pre-natal infanticide. You say that when their emotional states upon becoming pregnant caused them to desire an abortion, they were forced to seek out quacks since the law prevented them from getting abortions from doctors. What of the poor racist? The mental and emotional problems which create in him a desire or even a need to feel superior to members of another group have been described by others and I will not detail them here. It is enough that they exist. He doesn't want violence. All he wants to do is keep the damn n-----s in their place. It's just that it's impossible to do that within the law nowadays. Things started off bad when the Negroes were freed from slavery and they've been getting worse ever since. Today, defenders of the purity of the white race are forced by stringent laws to bomb churches and shoot troublemakers like Medgar Evers in the back. We obviously should avoid this mob violence by repealing these laws and constitutional amendments and letting local legal authorities provide a solution to the problem.

FROM

Ted Pauls
1448 Meridene Drive
Baltimore, Maryland, 21212
U. S. A.



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Len Moffatt
10202 Belcher
Downy, Calif., 90242

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